Site C

There is no 'right' answer as to what government should do with respect to Site C. There will be unavoidable adverse impacts if the project is completed -- impacts that some First Nations and residents argue are unacceptable and unnecessary. At the same time it should be clear that there will likely be significant costs to ratepayers if the project is terminated at this time. BC Hydro, the agency that by far has the most expertise capable of analyzing the cost consequences, calculated that terminating Site C would be some $7.5 billion (in 2018 present value terms) more expensive for ratepayers than completing the project. BCUC, based on its own set of assumptions and calculations, concluded the difference in cost would be small, within the error of the estimates, but its actual numbers also suggest that ratepayers would likely be significantly worse off if the project is terminated at this time. After correcting for errors in its surplus sales calculations, BCUC reported th

In its final report, the BCUC concluded that the overall costs of completing Site C would be roughly the same as terminating the project and pursuing an alternative portfolio of DSM, wind and geothermal projects as required. There would be a cost advantage to completing Site C if load grows more rapidly than the Commission assumed and a cost advantage to the alternative portfolio if Site C costs escalate higher than $10 billion. It is important to note, however, that BCUC reached this conclusion based on a manifestly unbalanced set of assumption and an incomplete assessment of costs for its alternative portfolio. As well this conclusion about overall cost does not address the marked differences in the timing of the cost and rate impacts, in particular the immediate challenge of the large rate impacts required to recover termination and sunk costs with its alternative portfolio that would not occur with the completion of Site C. Lack of balance in assumptions : BCUC concluded t